In the West, Rumen Radev’s government in Bulgaria has been portrayed as the result of a pro-Russia and Putinist outburst among gullible masses and a pro-Russia turn among confused youngsters. In her contribution to the “Deep Democracy” series, Tania Orbova argues that although the people in government have changed, the underlying political and economic order has remained largely the same. This explains the growing frustration with a democratic system that offers elections but not a choice.
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In April, Bulgaria held its eighth parliamentary election in five years. It appears that the country’s long-running political crisis may finally be coming to an end. Voters can now look forward to a period of relative stability as former president Rumen Radev and his newly formed Progressive Bulgaria (PB) party secured a parliamentary majority.
Until April, Bulgaria was governed by a series of caretaker administrations and fragile, illegitimate coalitions. This turbulent period began with anti-government protests during the Covid-19 pandemic in the summer of 2020 and ended with nationwide demonstrations in December 2025. This was followed by Radev’s decisive electoral victory.
The liberal media celebrated the December protests as a political awakening of Gen Z, yet Radev’s subsequent victory was portrayed by much of the same media as an outburst of ‘pro-Russia’ and Putinist sentiment by gullible masses and an anti-European turn among confused youngsters. As argued elsewhere, however, this narrative offers little explanatory value. Instead, it reflects the worldview of Bulgaria’s metropolitan middle-class right – a perspective that the Western media has largely uncritically adopted, as it aligns with a broader tendency to interpret political developments through a geopolitical, West-versus-Russia lens.
The logical culmination of a political search
Radev’s victory was not unexpected. Rather, it was the logical culmination of a political search that voters have been engaged in since 2020. They sought an alternative to the neoliberal model associated with corruption, which is represented by GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria), a center-right party established with strong backing by the right in Germany. GERB has been in and out of power since 2009.
Following the protests of summer 2020, the first figure to step into the spotlight was Slavi Trifonov, a well-known television host, musician, and media entrepreneur. Together with a group of scriptwriters from his show, he founded the political party ITN (There Is Such a People). The party won the election but failed to form a government. The focus then shifted to the so-called ‘Harvard brothers,’ Asen Vasilev and Kiril Petkov. They rose to prominence in a caretaker government appointed by Radev and later formed the We Continue the Change (PP) movement. This movement merged with the right-wing party Democratic Bulgaria (DB). PP-DB first attempted to arrest Boyko Borissov, the long-standing leader of GERB, only to later enter into a coalition with him and Delyan Peevski, a highly controversial figure and media oligarch who is the current leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS).
Peevski has long been a symbol of corruption and is probably the most hated politician. The coalition was justified on the grounds that it was necessary for Bulgaria’s adoption of the Euro – a move that was unpopular among the general public – and for the passage of a highly controversial package of constitutional reforms. However, most voters did not accept this justification. Meanwhile, the far-right party Vazrazhdane gained popularity starting in 2020. First, it ran an anti-vaccine campaign during the pandemic, which killed around one percent of Bulgaria’s population. Later, it held nationalist protests against the euro. Throughout this period, however, successive governments failed to address Bulgaria’s affordability crisis, worsening social inequality, and the collapse of public services.
A military general and pilot
Radev, a military general and pilot, won the 2016 presidential election with the backing of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). He quickly became the most popular politician, except among Sofia’s bourgeoisie, who labeled him a Putinist. He emerged as the leading opponent of GERB’s corrupt rule. Throughout his presidency, Radev repeatedly urged the political elite to address citizens’ everyday concerns, such as inflation, profiteering, and the cost of living. This helped him become a relatable figure widely seen as moderate, center-left, conventional, and well-spoken, as well as something of a father figure to the nation.
During his second presidential term, a position that is usually largely ceremonial, he played a central role in political life by appointing caretaker cabinets. In a context where trust in democratic institutions was critically low, the presidential institution was the only one enjoying a relatively good reputation. He also proposed a referendum on adopting the euro, which appealed to many who were skeptical that the euro would solve any of their problems.
Radev’s landslide victory was not surprising; it was merely the latest attempt by voters to find an alternative to the despised GERB model. However, the policies he proposed during the campaign and in the first weeks of his administration suggest ideological continuity rather than rupture, particularly in economic policy.
The despised GERB model
The GERB model is primarily criticized for corruption, but corruption is only one aspect of it. Equally central are its commitment to fiscal austerity and regressive taxation, as well as its neoliberal management of social services. This management style channels public funds to private providers while forcing underfunded state schools and hospitals to operate like businesses. These features are rarely at the center of discussions about the ‘model’ itself. Consequently, virtually every political force presenting itself as an alternative has ended up reproducing the same policies – policies that continue to place Bulgaria among the EU’s most unequal societies and poorest member states.
Within the first weeks of the new parliament, discussions were already underway about cutting cultural spending, downsizing the public administration, and shortening maternity leave – one of the few socialist-era achievements that survived the post-1989 transition. The government plans to implement stricter fiscal discipline in order to reduce the deficit to less than 3 percent, a goal supported by virtually every finance minister thus far. The same applies to the flat income tax, which no major political force has dared to challenge despite its regressive nature. It turns out that Progressive Bulgaria is not in favor of progressive taxation.
Only two months in, Radev now appears less like the former Socialist-backed candidate who won his first term with leftist support and more like a conservative father rejected by urban liberals. Following the latest election, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) lost its parliamentary representation, leaving parliament without a leftist presence. Many left voters switched to PB, but the Socialist Party is responsible for this outcome. The party has long since replaced left-wing policies with reactionary identity politics, notably campaigning against so-called ‘gender ideology.’ Now, it is up to the BSP’s new leader, Krum Zarkov, who has pledged to return the party to an authentically left-wing agenda, to rebuild and reinvent the BSP outside of parliament.
Shifting priorities toward rearmament
Furthermore, this neoliberal continuity in power closely aligns with the EU’s shifting priorities toward rearmament and increased military spending. Meanwhile, the fight against climate change and the implementation of the green transition are being pushed further and further to the margins of political debate. In this respect, having a NATO general lead the country seems like a perfect fit for this new EU direction. But what does this mean for democracy in Bulgaria?
Amid political turbulence at the start of the year, Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov (GERB) brought Bulgaria into Trump’s Board for Peace initiative after his resignation and amid nationwide protests against his government. Later, acting prime minister Andrey Gurov (PP) signed a security cooperation agreement with Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky without seeking ratification by the national assembly. Meanwhile, the U.S. military used Sofia Airport for operations connected to the war against Iran, prompting an official warning from Iran to Bulgaria’s government.
More broadly, Bulgaria’s democratic political elites have often acted in distinctly undemocratic ways during periods of political uncertainty, especially regarding controversial issues like war. One thing remains clear: war is rarely democratic. Decisions about war are usually made outside of normal democratic processes, either during states of emergency that suspend democratic norms or when democratic accountability is effectively suspended.
‘Peace diplomacy’ or ‘growth through militarization’?
At this stage, it is difficult to fully assess Radev and his government. The cabinet approved a brief extension of the agreement permitting the use of a civilian airport by U.S. military aircraft, while requesting visa-free travel for Bulgarian citizens in exchange for continued access to the facility – a request that the U.S. has thus far been reluctant to grant. Therefore, Radev’s move appears less like an attempt to deepen military cooperation and more like a way of regaining civilian control over the airport. However, the question remains: What will happen when the extension expires and the U.S. refuses to vacate the facility?
Additionally, Progressive Bulgaria recently announced that Bulgaria will end its military assistance to Ukraine. This is consistent with Radev’s long-standing position on the war. He has frequently been accused of Putinism because his statements on the war against Ukraine lack the hysterical tone of the urban right. For them, the conflict has been the defining political issue of recent years despite Bulgaria’s domestic problems. At times, even adopting the euro appeared to take a back seat to expectations of Russia’s complete military defeat and continued open-ended support for President Zelensky. Against this backdrop, Radev’s calls for negotiations and a more realistic assessment of the prospects for ending the war may appear ‘pro-Russia’ to some observers. In reality, however, they closely align with public opinion. In 2025, 94% believed the war should end through negotiations and diplomacy.
However, this decision is not driven by pacifist or anti-militarist ideals. Rather, it reflects a desire to prioritize Bulgaria’s own rearmament, which is entirely in keeping with the European Union’s new military orientation. As Defense Minister Dimitar Stoyanov noted, “Cutting military aid does not necessarily mean cutting arms sales” (Bulgaria remains a significant arms producer). The war in Ukraine would simply fall under the Ministry of Economy’s jurisdiction.
Is Bulgaria at an impasse?
Today, the political order presents a far more acceptable face. GERB and the DPS are now seen by many as little more than mafia-like organizations. Their public image and aesthetics were so closely associated with the failures of that period that they often seemed to be the problem themselves, overshadowing their actual policies. In contrast, Radev appears to most of his supporters as an educated, honest, and genuinely caring politician, and by most accounts, he is precisely that. He stands in sharp contrast to the thuggish and eccentric public images associated with Borissov and Peevski, which were immortalized in scandals involving photographs of pistols, stacks of cash, and gold bars.
However, this change is merely cosmetic. The faces have changed, but the underlying political and economic order remains largely the same. This explains the growing frustration with a democratic system that offers elections but not a choice. The last election revealed that political life in Bulgaria has reached a dead end: there is no left.